Presentation information

Organized Session

Organized Session » [OS] OS-1

[2D4-OS-1a] 計算社会科学(1)

Wed. Jun 5, 2019 3:20 PM - 5:00 PM Room D (301B Medium meeting room)

鳥海 不二夫(東京大学)、笹原 和俊(名古屋大学)、吉田 光男(豊橋技術科学大学)、瀧川 裕貴(東北大学)、榊 剛史(ホットリンク)、高野 雅典(サイバーエージェント)

3:40 PM - 4:00 PM

[2D4-OS-1a-02] The emergence and evolution of communication systems in dilemma games with messaging

〇Naoki Inoue1, Junya Morita1 (1. Shizuoka University)

Keywords:Communication, Experimental semiotics, Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis

This research focuses on the emergence and evolution of human communication system, following Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis, which claims social intelligence resulted from the successful exploitation of rivals for personal benefits.
Based on the framework of experimental semiotics, we design a dilemma game with messaging as a means to explore what kind of communication system is emerged and how it evolves in the laboratory experiment. In this game, graphical symbols are generated through interaction between pairs of players, and a dilemma of sharing and monopoly of rewards occurs. We consider that such a situation produces concealment of the betrayal intention utilizing the ambiguity of the symbols. The emergence and evolution of the novel communication system was examined with a small laboratory experiment. Our data suggested that this game causes ambiguity of communication protocol like polysemy.