Presentation information

General Session

General Session » [GS] J-7 Agents

[4N2-J-7] Agents: social multiagents

Fri. Jun 7, 2019 12:00 PM - 1:40 PM Room N (Front-right room of 1F Exhibition hall)

Chair:Yoshihiro Ichikawa Reviewer:Masayuki Otani

12:00 PM - 12:20 PM

[4N2-J-7-01] Emergence of Coordination in Iterated Battle of the Sexes Game with Reinforcement Learning Players

〇Akira Masumi1,2, Shohei Hidaka2 (1. National Institute of Technology, Okinawa College, 2. Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology)

Keywords:Coordination, Uncertainty, Game Theory, Reinforcement Learning, Agent Simulation

A coordination between individuals with conflict of interests is a crucial issue for achieving a joint cooperation. The Iterated Battle of the Sexes Game (IBoS) is a game-theoretic model which formulates a difficulty of the coordination between individuals in repeated interaction, in which an existence of multiple Nash equilibria pose a problem of equilibrium selection. Regarding this problem, recent empirical studies have shown that human game players with bounded rationality can achieve a coordination based on experiences gained through repeated interaction. In this study, we introduced a reinforcement learning (RL) model as a player of the IBoS and analyzed an equilibrium structure of the game. As a result of theoretical and numerical analysis, we found a cooperative turn-taking is supported as a unique Nash equilibrium of the game, in which each of individual satisfy their interests alternatively. This results provide a possible mechanism to achieve a feasible cooperative turn-taking.