[2N4-OS-17a] OS-17 (1)

[2N4-OS-17a-01] (OS invited talk) Theory of Constrained Matching

〇Makoto Yokoo¹ (1. Kyushu University)

Keywords:Matching, constraints, game theory, mechanism design

The theory of two-sided matching (e.g., assigning residents to hospitals, students to schools) has been extensively developed, and it has been applied to design clearinghouse mechanisms in various markets in practice. As the theory has been applied to increasingly diverse types of environments, however, researchers and practitioners have encountered various forms of distributional constraints. As these features have been precluded from consideration until recently, they pose new challenges for market designers. One example of such distributional constraints is a minimum quota, e.g., school districts may need at least a certain number of students in each school in order for the school to operate. In this talk, I present an overview of research on designing mechanisms that work under distributional constraints.