[2T4-GS-5] Agents

[2T4-GS-5-01] Unilateral-Defection, Mutual-Defection strategy in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Implementation Errors

〇Shinnichiro Murai¹, Atushi Iwasaki¹ (1. The University of Electro-Communications)

[[Online]]

Keywords:Evolutionary Games, Repeated Games, Implementation Errors

In this study, we examine what strategies survive under infinite group dynamics when players cause implementation errors in an iterated prisoner's dilemma. In the previous studies, the Win-Stay, Lose-Shift (WSLS) strategy, which is a representative strategy can be the most abundant in the presence of implementation errors among memory-one strategies.
In contrast, we use replicator-mutator dynamics to examine the consequences in a strategy space represented by finite state automata within two states. As a result, we observe a Unilateral Defection, Mutual Defection (UDMD) strategy that behaves effectively when players cause implementation errors, and clarified the survival process.