[2J5-GS-5] Agents:

[2J5-GS-5-04] Average Voting Rules for Various Populations

Single-peakedness and Participation

〇Shota Miyamoto¹, Taiki Todo¹, Makoto Yokoo¹ (1. Kyushu-University)

Keywords:Facility Location Games, Strategic Abstention, Single-peaked preferences

This paper studies social choice under single-peaked preferences, where voters’ participation is voluntary. We say a social choice function satisfies participation if, for any voter, participating by reporting her true preference is weakly better than not participating. For each of two classes of parametarized social choice functions, namely ordered weighted average (OWA) methods and weighted average (WA) methods, we give a necessary and sufficient condition on the parameters to satisfy participation. We also give further discussions on OWAs and WAs, including the necessary and sufficient condition to satisfy a weaker notion of participation called non-obvious abstention (NOA), and the relationship among strategy-proofness, non-obvious manipulability, participation, and NOA.