Japan Geoscience Union Meeting 2021

Presentation information

[J] Oral

H (Human Geosciences ) » H-DS Disaster geosciences

[H-DS08] Human environment and disaster risk

Sun. Jun 6, 2021 3:30 PM - 4:30 PM Ch.15 (Zoom Room 15)

convener:Tatsuto Aoki(School of Regional Development Studies, Kanazawa University), Hiroshi, P. Sato(College of Humanities and Sciences, Nihon University), Chairperson:Tatsuto Aoki(School of Regional Development Studies, Kanazawa University), Hiroshi Sato(College of Humanities and Sciences, Nihon University)

4:00 PM - 4:15 PM

[HDS08-10] Characteristics of International Risk Communication over Trans-boudary Volcanic Disaster-The Case of 2010 Iceland Volcano Erution

*Mayumi Sakamoto1, Haruhisa Nakamichi2, Wakana Takahashi3, Chizu Arashima4, Masaru Arakida5 (1.Graduate School of Disaster Resilience and Governance, University of Hyogo, 2.Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University, 3.School of International Studies, Utsunomiya University, 4.Faculty of Global Communication, Kobe Gakuin University, 5.Asian Disaster Reduction Center)

Keywords:trans-boundary volcanic disaster, Eyjafjallajökull, risk communication

This study tries to identify characteristics of international risk communication over trans-boundary volcanic disaster. By analyzing policy making processes over international air traffic disturbances caused by 2010 Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull eruption, it tries to describe its characteristics.

The 2010 Icelandic volcanic eruption caused airport closures or flight cancelations in Europe which resulted in huge socio-economic damages. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) had prepared Volcanic Ash Contingency Plan for EUR Region in 2009, however the plan was not sufficient to solve the problem caused by eruption. ICAO set “zero tolerance” for aircraft flying over volcanic eruptions in order to avoid the risk of jet engine shutdowns. In order to solve the problem, "acceptable tolerance" was discussed based on science and technology data, suchg as in-situ ash forecast over Europe or jet engine tolerance to airborne particles were required.

This case demonstrated difficulty of international policy making under an emergent situation regarding to the issue which was not defined in existing systems, but requires precise science and technological data. As for the case of 2010 eruption, the following points were discussed.
The first was the improvement of a communication system to revise volcanic ash forecast. As for the 2010 eruption, the disaster response was decided based on the forecast by the London VAAC, which observes atmospheric volcanic ash clouds including Iceland. However, international communication systems among volcano monitoring institutes were vulnerable. After the eruption, interenational communication system was revised.

Second, the importance of science and technological data regarding to the jet engine tolerance to airborne particles. After the eruption, governments, air plane companies and research institutes examined the effect of volcanic ash to jet engines and discussed engine tolerance.

Third, the necessity of an international policy-making mechanism. After the eruption, video conferences were held by the Ministers of Transportation of EU member states, led by the European Commission, and provisional standards were discussed. After this disaster, the European Commission established the European Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell (EACCC) as a permanent institute for the risk management.
The experience demonstrated the necessity of the international risk communication system to share in-situ information among different actors such as countries where volcanoes are located, countries which suffers by volcanic ash dispersion or organizations which monitor volcanic ash.