信頼、健康、紛争：危機への社会経済的対応

[2E203] インセンティブ制度下における医療ボランティアの感染症予防製品の販売促進活動
ーインドネシアジョグジャカルタ特別州における実証研究ー

*劉 子瑩^1,2 (1. 神戸大学、2. 一般財団法人　アジア太平洋研究所)

キーワード：金銭インセンティブ、医療ボランティア、予防医療、販売促進、インドネシア

Community health volunteers are closely connected to their communities, making them well-positioned to encourage preventive health behaviors in their community. Monetary incentives are commonly used to boost motivation; however, they can sometimes backfire in pro-social tases, such as volunteer activities or blood donations, where altruism is the primary motivator. This study explores what forms of incentives effectively motivate health volunteers to spread high-performance face masks in their community to prevent infectious diseases. A randomized controlled trial (RCT), in which a small monetary incentive, a large monetary incentive, or a social incentive was randomly assigned to the participants, was undertaken. In addition, half of the participants were randomly assigned to one group whose sales outcomes disclosed to their colleagues, whereas sales outcomes were kept confidential among the other group, with the intention of stimulating more competition among them. The analytical results firstly find that, regardless of disclosing the volunteers’ sales information or not, health volunteers sell more masks when receiving a larger monetary incentive. The results secondly show information disclosure promotes the total sales of health volunteers only when they receive a small monetary incentive. Under the condition of information disclosure, some might be embarrassed if they receive a large monetary reward for pro-social activities. This study provides valuable evidence for possible improvements in CHWs’ activity management for policymakers in Indonesia and, potentially, in other developing countries. Furthermore, this research contributes to the broad literature evaluating the effect of incentives in public health and behavior economics literature studying how to better motivate people driven by altruism to engage in pro-social activities.